Does Schleiermacher's Christian Faith contain what the older dogmaticians would have called at reatise de trinitate?M any contemporary theologians, even those having some familiarity withS chleiermacher'sm asterpiece, might be hard pressedt oa nswert he question. In view of the fact that Schleiermacher'sd ogmatics doesi ndeed contain aq uite detailed, thoughh ighly compressed, discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, clearly labeled as such and showing evidence of exceedingly careful thought, this state of affairs is remarkable. To account for it is already to begin to search for aw ay beyond the utter neglect with which Schleiermacher's thoughts on theT rinity have usuallyb een met since the mid-nineteenth century.
cal prejudices associated with the increasingly effaced battle lines of the previous century, whichc ontinues to be as erious hindrance to closer investigation of Schleiermacher'sT rinitarian ideas. 2 As signaled by the just cited phrase, it has proven almost irresistible to conclude from the location of Schleiermacher'se xplicit discussion of the Trinity (a discrete andr elativelyb rief section at the end of the work) that Schleiermacher'si nterest in the doctrine must have been perfunctory, its role in his dogmaticsm arginal. But however natural or obvious this judgment may seem, it is as uperficial one. 3 The paper whichf ollows intends to contribute to the ongoing reassessment of Schleiermacher'sT rinitarian thought by interpreting that concluding section in aw ay which contests this tendency to isolate it, to detach it from the broader themes of the dogmatics. 4 The paper will emphasize precisely how Schleiermacher'se ntire 2 The structural question here is concerned with Schleiermacher'sown conception of the Trinity, and must be distinguished from the issue of the influence of Schleiermacher on the way later theologians handled the doctrine. Maintaining this distinction is important in assessing Welch's claim, for example, that Schleiermacher'sthought was one of the factors "most directly responsible for subsequent questioning of the importance and validity of the doctrine of the Trinity." W ELCH (see above, n. 1), 3. One might concede Welch'sp oint by saying that some ideas or emphases of Schleiermacher'sc oncerning the epistemology of faith and the nature of doctrinal language, as they were widely taken up and internalized by many nineteenth-century Protestant theologians, probably did contribute to an eglect of the Trinity (although it is just as arguable that the genuine roots of that neglectr un much further back in history). But it is essential to recognize, for the purposes of the present discussion, that such an outcome does not in itself prove anything about the role or importance of Trinitarian ideas for Schleiermacherh imself; indeed, it is arguable that the ensuing dissolution of Trinitarian discourse was contrary to Schleiermacher'so wn intentions. Otherwise put, the fact that some of Schleiermacher'si deas contributed in some way to the marginalization of the Trinity among later theologians does not imply that Schleiermacher'sown theology ignored or denigrated it. 3 As astart, it must be firmly maintainedthat any reference to the concluding Trinitarian discussion of the Glaubenslehre as an "appendix",a si nstancedb yW elch and countless other commentators, simply cannot be taken as an eutral description: it already implies ap olemical comment on Schleiermacher'sT rinitarianism( am isleading and prejudicial one,a st his paper will suggest). As at ranslation it is simply erroneous, in light both of the function of that section, and of the title Schleiermacher actually gave it (it is called the 'Schluss',t he 'conclusion',i n both editions). 4 The concern here is with exegesis of Schleiermacher'so wn texts, and not with discussions in the secondary literature, although it can be remarked in passing that direct treatments of his Trinitarian thought have been relatively sparse. Indeed, aq uick survey would reveal that past treatments of Schleiermacher'sd octrine of God proper seldom broach the issue of the Trinity, tending to focus either on the general relation of God and world or else on Schleiermacher'sr ethinking of the divine attributes. Even quite penetrating discussions can evade the whole subjectw ith ease, but this becomes understandable once it is grasped that Schleiermacher does not see the doctrine of the Trinity as part of the doctrine of God, but rather more the reverse: his doctrine of God is one element withinh is Trinitarian conception. There are promising recent signs of more detailed interest in Schleiermacher'sT rinitarian ideas as such. Especially noteworthy is the inclusion of Francis Schüssler F IOREN-ZA'S fine overview( " Schleiermacher'su nderstanding of God as triune")i nt he Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher,e d. by Jacqueline M ARIÑA (Cambridge, Cam-discussion of the Trinity is intricately linked with, in fact substantively derivative of, certaine arlier sections of his dogmatics; it is ak ind of metadoctrine, coordinated witha nd coordinating the central Schleiermacherian accounts of how Christianr edemption functions. This reconnection of the Trinity witho therd octrines will have the additional purpose of uncovering the basic logic of the doctrine as Schleiermachers ees it: the threefold reception of the infinite being of the creator within the confines of the finite createdo rder.
The first section will examine the close link between Schleiermacher's notion of redemption and the ontology of the incarnation. The seconda nd third sections willt hen examine that ontology in some detail as ac omplex and profoundc onceptualization of Paul'sa ffirmation that "God was in Christ".T he fourth section will show how Schleiermachert hen extends and transforms that conception of incarnation in order to explain by analogy the redeeming presence of the Holy Spirit in the church. The fifth section will then indicate how attentiont ot hese previous discussions helps to deliver am ore satisfactory verdicto nt he question of the dogmaticf unction of the doctrine of the Trinity in Schleiermacher. As ixth and final section will return to the question with which the essay began, that of the "concluding" location of Schleiermacher'st reatise, in order to reflect on what he thought he had achievedt here, as wella sw hat lessonsc ontemporary theology might begin to draw from it.
I.
The doctrine of the Trinity in Schleiermacher centers on the way God is present and activei nr edemption, at least when redemption is understood (as Schleiermacher claims to do) in classical or "ecclesial" terms. Roughlys peaking,t his means conceiving redemption as union withG od, by means of the Holy Spirit joining the believer to Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word. God, in other words,i sj oined originally to the human being Jesus, and is joined secondarily or derivatively (through the Spirit) to the human beings making up the believing community. Thus the conceptual keyt oS chleiermacher'sr eformulation of the ecclesial doctrine of redemption is to be foundi nh is notion of ag enuine union between the divine being andh uman nature, andi no rder to fathom what this means for him it will be necessary to look carefully at one of the most dense and suggestive passagesi nh is dogmatics, the second paragraph of proposition 94 of thes econd edition.
bridge University Press, 2006, 171 -88). The devotion of an entire chapter to this topic in ab asic introduction to Schleiermacher'st houghtw ould have seemed unthinkable until recently.
That any adequate grasp of the Christian message dependsu pon the propera ssessment of Christ'sc onstitution is ap ointm ade here in no uncertain terms. For it is thep eculiar dignityo fC hrist'sp erson, the utterly unique ontological status of his selfhood, which makes it possible to grant him the exclusive title of "the" redeemer, to ascribe to him the completion of the creation of humanity, to see in him the founder and the continued source of powero fareligious community whichi sd estined to overtake and absorb every other religious community: to do justice to all of this, Schleiermacher asserts, demands nothing less than the affirmation of God's "existence" [Sein]i nC hrist ( § 94.2; CG II 54 [CF 386]).
5 Ac asual reading can easily miss the seriousness with which Schleiermacher is prepared to take this language,a nd the effort he takes to explicate it. The weightiness of the claim can only be grasped againstt he background of the austere and, it could even be said, rigorously "classical" manner in whichS chleiermacher understands the utter transcendence of thed ivine creator in relation to all finite, spatio-temporal reality. His stringenta ffirmations of the divine 5 All parenthetical references in the text are to proposition number and paragraph number of the second edition (1830/31) of the Glaubenslehre,f ollowed by the volume and page number of the German ('CG')a nd page number of the English ('CF')e ditions noted below. Apart from some silent emendations, direct quotations will follow the latter edition. However, two translation decisions made throughout the following discussion should be especially highlighted. Schleiermacher refers repeatedly both to the divine "Sein" and to the divine "Wesen".
In the standard English version, the translators are not completely consistent, choosing to render "Sein" as "existence" but sometimes as "being",a nd "Wesen" as either "being" or as "essence." Although these choices are surely defensible in terms of the shifting contexts in which the words appear, Ih ave thoughti tb est to employ a uniform rendering of "Sein" as "existence" and "Wesen" as "being," omitting the standard version'sf requent use of capitalization when these terms are used of God. Although etymologically both of these are nominal forms of the verb "to be," in Schleiermacher'susage the former tendstor etain more of a "verbal" feel (suggesting presence as activity), while the latter retains something of a "nominative" heft (suggesting the unity and identity of the divine reality); my choices try to honor these patterns. Granted, translating "Wesen" by "essence" is especially tempting in Trinitarian discussions where "the one divine essence" has by long custom been juxtaposed with "the three persons" as ways of referring to God as one and God as three, respectively. However, speaking of the divine "essence",e ven in contexts where Schleiermacheri sc learly picking up and continuing such earlier dogmatic discussions, could potentially mislead if it suggested ag enus or kind standing over against other kinds. His quite justified rejection of any such notion is the source of his sharp criticism of the phrase "divine nature" (Natur)( §96.1; CG II 62 -4[ CF 392 -3]). The fact that he shortly thereafter in the same section (CG II 66 -7[ GF 395]) commends the term "Wesen" as more appropriately used of God than the term "Natur" is allthe more reason to avoid any translation of the former which might suggest proximity to the latter. Where the standard English translation has been quoted directly in what follows, it has been altered to bring it into line with the practice just described.
transcendence force him to specify with great care and precision what it might mean for the divine existence to be "in" the worldo r" in" Christ. The conceptual equation which lies at the heart of this notion is stated immediately at the beginning of §94.2.T os peako ft he existence of God in Christ is "completely the same thing" as to ascribe to him an absolutely powerful God-consciousness( §94.2; CG II 55 [CF 387]). 6 The rest of §94.2 is devoted to showing why this is so. The issue is complex, and rooted deeply in the difficulties of Schleiermacher'soverallunderstandingofthe relation of Creatort oc reation. The parallel discussion from the first edition of the Christian Faith ( § 116.3) will be cited at some points in order to shed alittle more light on the obscurities of Schleiermacher'se xposition here. What follows is an interpretive restatement of what is at issue for him in this equating of divine existence in Christ with his unique God-consciousness.
Therea re two stages to Schleiermacher'se xplanation. First,i nsofara s we can speak of an existence of God "in" the world as aw hole,i ti so nly possibleb ecause there is an existence of God in human nature. Second, insofar as we can speak of an existence of God "in" human nature, it is only possibleb ecause of the presence of perfect or absolutely powerful God-consciousness. To put it another way, the presence of God in rational consciousness "mediates" to separatet hings God'sp resence in the world as a whole,a nd the presence of Jesus Christ among human beings "mediates" to them God's( potential) presence in rational consciousness in general. 7 The two following sections takeupe ach stage in turn. 6 In Schleiermacher'su sage concepts such as "God-consciousness", "immediate self-consciousness",a nd "feeling" indicate elemental factors in what might be called his ontology of subjectivity. What is at issue is the structure of human selfhood as areality within the world, and not the description of transitory psychological states. 7 The exact phrase "rational consciousness" does not appear in Schleiermacher'st exts, but the idea is clearly at work in the key passage of The Christian Faith ( § 94.2) under analysis here. It would be misunderstood if it were taken to refer to some special human faculty, like knowledge. In fact, the term "rational consciousness" in Schleiermacher'su sage could almost be taken as as ynonym for "adult human being".T he terms "reason" and "rational" refer to the realm of the spiritual/mental (geistlich)a sopposed to the natural. See here the basic definitions laid out in his 1812/13l ectures on philosophical ethics, especially in the "Introduction" to the lectures as aw hole, section I, theses 16 -18, and section III, theses 39, 68 -70, 78; and also in "The highest good",I ntroduction, theses 1 -6. F. ), 4, 6 -7, 9 -10, 13 -14. As for the term consciousness, it can for Schleiermacher refer to that lower grade of confused "awareness" which characterizes sub-human organisms, as well as the very early stages of psychological development in the human individual ( § 5.1; CG I4 1-2[ CF 18 -9]), but it most properly refers to the receptive awareness of the integral and mature human being (i.e. one capable of ac lear distinction of self and world, subject and object), and is dividedi nto two forms: knowing and feeling ( § 3.3; CG II 25 [CG 8]). Knowing is object-consciousness,w hile feeling is immediate self-consciousness, and it is with theG od-consciousness always inherent in the latter that Schleiermacheri sp articularly
II.
Why is it only possiblet os peak of God'se xistence "in" the world on the basis of the presence in the worldo fr eason or consciousness? Schleiermacher begins witht he obvious point that God'so mnipresence makesi mpossiblea ny literal notion that God'se xistence is somehow spatially distributed in an uneven way through the createdrealm. And yetitwill be recalled from the discussions of the First Part of the Christian Faith that our consciousness of God takes theformofanapprehensionofthe sheer, pure causality always presupposed not just by our own activity as af inite cause, but by the entirei nterconnected networko ff inite causality (the so-called "nature-system"), an etwork in which we increasinglyp erceive ourselves to be embedded the more our self-consciousness develops and refines itself. Would this not mean that our consciousness would inevitably "see" God as more presentw here finite activity was more intense, where the balance betweena ctivea nd passive statest ilted more towardt he active side, thereby introducing av ariance in divine presence which would underminet he doctrine of omnipresence? Schleiermacheradmitsthis is true, but, borrowing an idea from classical patristic thoughti nt he person of John Damascene, he says that this more "intense" presence of God signals no spatial distinction in the divine causality itself, but only ad istinction in the "receptivity" of finite being. In other words,i ti sp recisely the more "active" finite causality whichi sf or that very reason the more "receptive" of the absolutec ausality of God,t he more open or transparent to it. As the first edition discussion helpfully clarifies, the language of God'se xistence "in" anyf inite thing is tantamount to saying that God'se xistence is "announcing itself" in that thing; that is, God'se xistence is not really "more" in one place than another, but it is more decisively revealed in one place than another. This is because God can only be conceived as "pure activity",acrucial point for all that follows. Schleiermacher is saying in effect thatG od is only revealed "in" the world where absolute causality appears, causality totally determining the finite but itself in no way exposed to reciprocal conditioning. Of course, this immediately presents an obstacle for anyt alk aboutadistinct finite thing "revealing" God or being al ocus of God'se xistence. Schleiermacherh as earlier insisted that all finite things are in themselvesc onstituted by an interconnection and interplay of active and passive states. And the passive aspect of any finite particular is not merelyt he term of ar elationshipw hose other term is the activity of some other individual finite ( § 51.1; CG I3 09 [CF 201]); properlyu nderstood it corresponds rather to the activity of the total interconnected pattern of cause and effect constituting the world.T hat is, every individualt hing is always conditioned by "everything else",b yt he universal nature-system itself ( § 46.1 -2; CG I 264
What is the result? On the one hand, God can only be said to "exist in" the worldw here ac ausal activity appears whicht otally conditions the finite, with no reciprocal being-conditioned.O nt he other hand, any isolated finite individual within the world is always as ite of confluence for activea nd passive relationsw ith other finite individuals. The upshot is that in no finite thing in isolation could the total and pure causal influence of God so manifest itself as to justify speaking of that thing as as elf-announcement or presence of the creative existence itself. Rather, God can only appear as the power conditioning the total interconnected systemo f finite causal interplay as aw hole.H ence Schleiermacher'sp reliminarys ummation: "there is, so far, no existence of God in any individual thing, but only an existence of God in the world" ( § 94.2 CG II 55 [CF 387]). Readers will once again recognize in this statement merely ac oncentrated recollection of conclusions drawn earlier in the Christian Faith,s uch as that the divine causality can only be conceived as equali ns cope to the totality of finite causality ( § 51.1; CG I3 09 [CF 201]), or that the worlda sawhole should be considered by piety to be ac ompleter evelation of the divine creativep ower ( § 57.1; CG I3 59 [CF 234]).
But this is obviouslyn ot thee nd of the story, for if the world as a whole is supposed to "reveal" God, the question arises, where in the world does this revelation happen, andt ow hom? The difficultyc an be statedt his way: even if there is an existence of God "in" the world as aw hole,i nt he previously stipulated sense that God'so mnipotence "announces" itself there, then this would have inner-worldly relevance only if the worlda s world were to "appear" somewhere within the world.A nd this is in fact the significance of Schleiermacher'sn exts tatements,t hose concerning the presence within the world of human being as rational consciousness. For thoughi tw as determined above that no isolated finite thing could reveal God'sp ure causality, could this stricture not be evaded if that finite thing were not isolated, if it were,a tl east in principle, ap ointo fi nterconnection with everything else -if it were,i ns hort, that point in the world where the world appeared? But this is just what rational consciousness amounts to for Schleiermacher.
It will be recalled from the introduction to the Christian Faith that consciousness is defined by the conjunction of living receptivity and free self-activity; these maket heir appearance in the human subject'ss elfawareness, that is, in immediates elf-consciousness or Gefühl,i nt he form of feelings of dependence and freedom ( § 4.1 -2; CG I3 2-7[ CF 13 -15]). Schleiermacher makes it clear that the living subject doesn ot receive influences from causes outside itself in a "purely passive" manner, but rather is actively passive, so to speak. In other words,w hat defines subjective life or spirit is the very act of continually taking up these external influences into itself, bringingt hem into its self-constitution moment by moment so that they always become data for its own consequent self-expressions in thought and deed. "Receptivity" is thus about how our subjective "selfactivity",t he ensembleo fo ur thinking and activee xistence, is at the same time the free response to, the reflection or "processing" of, the totality of external forces which have always already conditioned and "placed" us.
Note the phrase "at the same time":t he subject'sl evel of receptivity and its level of self-activity are emphatically not competing or inverselyrelated quantities. Conscious lifei sm ore intenset ot he degree that both receptivity ands elf-activity extend their scope with regard to all that is beyond the subject ( § 122.1; CG II 284 [CF 566]). It is precisely the mark of intelligent or rational consciousness thatt his power of "extension" is, at least in principle, at am aximum. For rational self-consciousness is marked by the ability not just to receive and freelyr eact to influences; the more it is developed, them ore it comes to see the interconnection of all finite influences on itself and on each other, and hence the more it comes to regard all of finite reality as as ystematic whole,i ncluding itself as an integral part. Thisi st he point of phrases like "the whole systemo fn ature or the world exists in our self-consciousness" and "is seated in the spirit as its original possession" ( § 34.1; CG I2 13 [CF 138]). And of course it is just reason'sc apacity for this kind of consciousness-of-world which Schleiermacher closely associates with its potentialf or consciousness-of-God, for "the equivalence of divine causality with the whole content of the finite enables every act to excite the religious consciousness, every act, that is, in which we take up into ourselves ap arto ft he natural order or identify ourselves with such ap art, every moment of our self-consciousness as it extendso ver the whole world" ( § 53.1; CG I3 18 [CF 207] ).
This notion of the development of consciousness as the mutual intensification ande xtension of livingr eceptivity and free self-activity is evidently presupposed in Schleiermacher'sr epeated assertion that finite causality is greatest in those points of spacew here clear human consciousness is active( as opposed to those points where either unconscious life or "dead" forces predominate, cf. §49.1; CG I2 96 -7[ CF 190 -1]). It also begins to point toward the solution of thep roblem of God'se xistence "in" the world. For though the degree of what Schleiermacher calls "pure passivity" in af inite thing doesi ndeed decreasea st hat thing'sd egree of activity increases, the special kind of "passivity" involved in livingr eceptivity is not diminished but actually intensifies according to the degree of free selfactivity. And this illuminates the point made earlier about the shifting "degree" of God'sp resence in as pecific place in spite of the necessary assertion of his omnipresence. God, as the absolute causality underlying all finite causality, is "more present" where finite causality is greatest not because of any variation in omnipresence but rather due to the variation "in the receptivity of the finite being to the causal activity of whicht he divine presence is related" ( § 53.1; CG I3 18 -19 [CF 208]).
It should now be clearer why the firsts tage of Schleiermacher'sd iscussion of the incarnation, that is, of God's "existence in" Jesus Christ, should concludet hat "it is only in ther ational individual that an existence of God can be admitted" ( § 94.2; CG II 55 [CF 387]) and that in fact it is "only through the rational nature that the totality of finite powers can become an existence of God in the world" ( § 94.2; CG II 56 [CF 388]). Finite rational consciousness is that place in the world where God's "pure causality" can potentially be expressed andr evealed, where it can "exist" quasi-locally. This is, first, because as intelligent it is capable (in principle) of grasping the systematic interconnection of all finite causes and its own co-implication with them in such aw ay that the true idea of God as sheer, absolute causality conditioning the whole spatio-temporal worldc an emergea sa no bject of thought. Second,t his is because its living receptivity is capable (again,i n principle) of an apprehension of God'sa bsolutec ausality which, as "higher self-consciousness",c ould penetratea nd control at each moment the "sensuous" or "lowers elf-consciousness" which mediates andg ives at one and direction to every livingm oment of thought and action. In these ways the living subject is able not only to represent God mentally, but to make the very texture of its existence an expression of God'sr eality.
III.
The presence of theq ualifier "in principle" in these descriptions of human spirit indicates the final obstacleb locking the possibility of God'se xistence "in" the world, whichi nt urn requires the second step in Schleiermacher'sa ccounto ft he incarnation. For the fact is that human godconsciousness in general, as an original capacity of the human species, does not fulfill this potential of constituting an "existence of God" in the world. Indeed it is utterlyi ncapableo ff ulfilling this potentialo ni ts own power, either individually or through the "natural" evolution of the species, and this incapacity is essential, not an accidental resulto fi ndividual or collective sinfulness. Evenw ere we to postulate a "first man" before the fall into sin we would still be in the realm of ap urely fortuitousl ack of undiminished God-consciousness always hovering on the brink of failure, not the kind of essentially triumphant internalp ower Schleiermacherh as in mind ( § 94.1; CG II 52 -3[ CF 385]). Only an ew creation of humanity, thec onsummation of ah uman race still essentially incomplete, and thus an ew, unfathomably original miracle of direct divine power wills erve here. In accordance with the ecclesial faith he cherishes, only the Redeemer, Jesus Christ, is the site of God'sg enuine, full creative presence "in" the world. This is clearly not the place to summarize Schleiermacher'sC hristology in its entirety. The pointi st of ocus on the rigorous sense in whichh e understands God'se xistence "in" Christ, seeing in the incarnation the salvific uniono ft he divine being with human nature. The foregoing discussion has already set out the necessary parameters, for the miraculous implanting of as upremely powerful consciousness of God in Jesus is the actualization of that presence of God in the world which human being should be,b ut apart from Christ is not and will never be.O riginal human being suffers from at wofold deficit destined to be overcome through the incarnation. Its consciousness of God, vitiated everywhere by the sinful tendency, cannota sserti tself in ways whicha re not "hemmed in and bent [gehemmtu nd gewendet]" by thel owers elf-consciousness. 9 Thism eans, first (recalling thet wofold distinction used above), its intelligence can never completely disentangle the sheer absolute activity of God from the interactions presentedt os ense-consciousness, and hence (even in the sphere of the most refined non-Christian monotheisms, those of Judaisma nd Greek philosophy) cannot represent God in thought without materialistic confusions and unchecked anthropomorphisms. Likewise, second, because the higher self-consciousness, in which God'sa bsolute causality is received and apprehended, is unable to gain complete mastery over the sensuous lower self-consciousness, the human self is unable to be completely determined in all its actions by the prior pure causality of God.
Triumph over this twofold failure, of course, provides the precise termsw ith whichS chleiermacher can now define the peculiar God-consciousness of Christ. The wording of the first editionm ore readily reveals this structural move (which nonetheless also underlies the discussion in the second edition):
If then God is neither able to portray himself [abbilden]i nu sw ith pure and perfect suitability, nor even to establish himself [sich erweisen]a sp ure activity (since God'se xistence can only be grasped as activity): so then this is no true and genuine existence of God in us. But what constitutes the Redeemer as such can accordingly be nothing other than such ap erfect indwelling of the highest being in consciousness, which can be reckoned as the pure activity of God in human nature, and in light of which we must say of the Redeemer, that God was in him in the highest sense in which God could be in an individual at all. Immediately following this passage the firste dition adds as ignificant clarification. The phrase "in the highest sense in whichG od could be in an individual at all" is not intended to mitigate the assertion that God really "is" in Jesus, as if it implied that this were merelyapictorial or poetic turn of phrase. Just the opposite: it is intended to signal thatt he presence of God in Christ, his unity with him, should be taken in the most complete fashion conceivable, indeed more complete than the turns of phrase used suggest,i nevitably containing within themselves as they do misleading images of two separate "things" coming together.
What then does Schleiermacheri ntend to suggest by this unity? Nothing less than this: the existence of God in him, the undiminished presence of absolutel oving causality, constitutes the very inner selfhood of Jesus Christ. This is because (as we have seen) only in af inite individual with consciousness and reason could that power whicht otally conditions all reality replicate itself as ap ower totally conditioningt he individual,t hat is, "continually ande xclusively determining [that individual's] every moment" ( § 94.2; CG II 56 [CF 388]). And only in Christ is this possibility realized.T hus God, precisely through being perfectly received in his consciousness as the total power determining the world,c onditions every aspect of his human existence through time. Schleiermacherc onfesses that thea nalogy famously used by theA thanasian creed, namelyt hat God and human being unite to form the one Jesus Christ just as the rational soul and the body unite to form as ingle human person, fits his intentions here precisely ["g(e)rade so"]( §96.3 footnote; CG II 69 [CF 397])a nd in fact "even if not clearly expressed, runs through the whole foregoing presentation of the subject" ( § 97.4; CG II 87 [CF 411]). To put this analogy in Schleiermacher'so wn terms, the innermost core of Jesus as ah uman self was nothing other than the pured ivine activity forming the "Impuls" determining his entire conscious anda ctivee xistence.H ence not just Jesus'sb odily life, but his entire human actuality, body andm ind, formedt he "Organismus",t he organic systemw hichr eflected and expressed the "Grundkraft" or fundamental force of God'sg enuine existence in him.
Schleiermacher'sz eal here can even encompass ar etrieval of the ancient doctrine of anhypostasis:t he incarnation of God in this human consciousness is not as econd, additional act to the "formation of human nature into the personality of Christ".N o, there would have been no person "Jesus Christ" at all apart from this initial divine impartation ( § 97.2; CG II 76 [CF 402]). Of course, his eagerness, searching criticisms notwithstanding, to align his own position as much as is possiblew ith the classical orthodox consensus never displaces the fundamental role forh im of the scriptural witness. In this case, Schleiermacher intends his entired iscussion to be nothing but ad ogmatic explication of the language of the New Testament,p articularlyP aul'sp hrase "God was in Christ" andJ ohn's "the Word became flesh" ( § 96.3; CG II 69 [CF 397]). The relevance of the first is obvious. As for the second, Schleiermacher (as is usually the case) finds the Johannine conception especially congenial given the right interpretation. As he reads it, "'Word' is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and 'flesh' is ag eneral expression for the organic." Thus he understands John'su se of "logos" to refer to the divine activity of creation as "mediated" by ar ational individual having perfect God-consciousness. For if all finite being or causality expresses the creative activity, consciousness, the highest form of finite causality we know, expresses this creativea ctivity precisely as at imeless "word",a se ternal meaning-for-consciousness. The fundamental force driving ands haping the human individual Jesus is this pured ivine power itself, the power of creationt aking shape within creation as consciousness; his integral humanityt husb ecomes the created "organ" for the new act of creation itself.
Such in brief is the substance of Schleiermacher'su nderstanding of the incarnation, of the way God was "in" Jesus Christ. One haso nly to read this material in order to see the extraordinary care he took in thinking through his position; equallye vident is the way in which his entire understanding of redemption is closelyi ntertwined with this presentation of Christ'sp erson.A sn oted at the beginning,h ei sv ery much aware that he is defending the legacy of the mainline reformation (itself carrying forward much of the orthodox legacy of Christian antiquity) and its official ecclesial bodies againstt hose "separatists",w hether of mystical/enthusiastic or of rationalist stripe, who repudiate the exclusive soteriological status here granted to Christ ( § 121.1; CG II 278 [CF 560]). Thus the ecclesial or "churchly" doctrine of redemption putst remendous structural weight on this notion of the "union" of the divine being with human nature in Christ.
Schleiermacher is especially sensitive to the threat presentedt oa dequate understanding of this union by anya ccount of Christ whichs ees in him an exalted superhuman or semi-divinep ower but whichs hrinks from affirming ad irect conjunction witht he creator.T he struggle againstA rianism in the fourth century was the crucible in whicht he early church clarified the truly divine status of Christ, andS chleiermachers ees himself compelledt oh onor the resultoft his struggle in his own dogmaticf ormulations, as page §123.2; CG II 289 [CF 571] makes clear. "The Churchh as properly rejected … all representations of Christ witha nA rian bias." Not only does Arianismi mply that our "living communionw ith Christ" unites the believer withs omething less than fullyd ivine,i ta lso threatens the created integrity of the human nature of Christ by fusing it withs ome putatively higher created nature. Either way, the Arian tendency cripples the ecclesial doctrine of redemption.
IV.
The quotation on Arianism actually comes from later in the Christian Faith,f rom the discussion of the Holy Spirit, even though it referse xpli-citly back to his Christology. This is one of many tokenso ft he very close relationship between Schleiermacher'sC hristologya nd his Pneumatology. In discussing the latter we can be very brief.T his is not because the doctrine lacks importance within Schleiermacher'ss ystem, but because its basic logic,t hat of au nion of divine being withh uman nature, has already been set forth in the discussion of Christ as God incarnate. And just as evident here is the soteriological orientation whichg uides the way the doctrine is handled. Schleiermacherl abors again and again to make clear the need for an actual presence of the divine existence "within" the world as an active locus of re-creativea ctivity to account fort he effect of redemption, namely the completion of humanity'sc reation through the renewed God-consciousness gaining mastery over sin. Jesus was that locus, but Jesus is now gone. What is required, then, must be another "existence" of God united with human nature, one which is enabled by the incarnation in Jesus but which now persists apart from his presence as an individual, and whichc ommunicatesh is special blessedness to others ( § 123.2; CG II 291 [CF 572]).
The coming of the Holy Spirit (Pentecost, to use the classical designation) inaugurates this secondu nion of God andh umanity; now God is present as the "common spirit" which animates the church, the religious communityo ft hose redeemed by Christ. As God was "in" Christ, so God must now be "in" the church in order to continue Christ'sr edeemingi nfluence, in order that his "effective power" may be communicated to others ( § 116.3; CG II 243 [CF 535]). All that will be attempted here will be to show briefly how the conceptual moves which Schleiermacher used to construe the divine-human union in Christ are simply replicated with some modificationst oc onstrue the divine-human union in the Church.
The key is that now not an individual but ac ollective is at issue;b ut the equation of God's "existence in" something with the presence there of an "absolutely powerful God-consciousness" is still operative. The wording of §144 of the first edition revealsb oth the parallelism andt he contrast: both Jesus Christ and the Churchi nvolve "Vereinigungen" of the divine being with human nature, but in the formerc ase this union is "personbildende" while in the latter it is "gemeinheitbildende".
11 Schleiermachere xplicates the collective nature of the union comprising the Holy Spiriti nt he following way. The Spiriti st hat in the redeemedw hich brings them together, binding them into au nity, energizing them towardm ore andm ore intensely loving fellowship,d riving them to ac ommon vision and work for God'sK ingdom ( § 121.1; CG II 278 -80 [CF 560 -2]). The Spirit, as befits the divine presence, is always self-identical even if it manifests itself in different ways in different individuals. But there is no "possessing" of the Spirit by an individual. Each hasashare in the common Spirit; they are conscious of their participation in this divine presence only as they are si- In short, the effect of the presence of the divine being in redeemed humanity is not the total formation of an individual, as it was with Jesus, but rather thef ormation of what Schleiermacher callsa" moral person". But this transition from individual person to collective person leaves the essential pictureo fd ivine presence intact.F or a "moral person" is the formationo fagroup of people into an organic systemw ith unified activity ( § 116.1; CG II 241 [CF 534]). Just as Jesus' individual humanityf ormed the "organism" receiving and expressing the divine presence, so the collective humanity of the church likewisef orms such an organism. And just as in Jesus what this organismr eceived and expressed was nothing less than the divine being, so that God was the fundamental power or "impulse" conditioning his personal existence, so toot he collective organism of the church is conditioned by the identical impulse, since the pure activity of God is always self-identical ( § 125.1; CG II 299 [CF 579]).
Af inal point about Schleiermacher'sp neumatology is in order, the importance of which will become clear in the last section of this paper. Although it is Christ who first makes possible the gathering of the church and the communication of the Holy Spirit, Schleiermacher insists that the union of divine and human involved in the latter is not of lesser status,b ut is to be reckoned as ad ivine "existence in" the world in precisely the same deep sense that he has outlined with regard to the incarnation. As suggested above,t he anti-Arian thrust of his argument is just as much in play in his pneumatology as in his Christology. Thisi sc lear both from the side of the divine "impulse",a nd from the side of the human "organism" whichi si ts receptacle. In Jesus the divine being formedhis innermost self;this "inwardness" is them ark of the "absolutely powerful" nature of his God-consciousness, whichi nt urn is equivalent to God'se xistence "in" him in the propers ense. To be "inward" or "innermost" in the human self is another way of indicating the "fundamental" status for personal existence of the force in question, its power as an unvitiated higher consciousness to condition all thought and activity. But the very same "sinless perfection andb lessedness" of Christ, the same "absolute andc ontinuous willing of the Kingdom of God",i ss econdarily the "innermost impulse" of the redeemed individual, albeito nly insofara si ti sa lready and primarily the common spirit of the whole church in which the Christian participates ( § 116.3; CG II 244 [CF 535 -6]). The result is that, even though conditionedb yC hrist and present only in all the redeemedc ollectively insofara st hey form one organic body,t he divine presence in the Churchi sn ol ess than that in Christ: "in virtue of its inwardness, it is in thewhole an absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and thus the existence of God therein" ( § 116.3; CG II 244 [CF 536]).
In the second place, it was seen that the incarnation involves a "reception" of this "quasi-local existence" of the divine being, an organism sufficient for or adequate to thep ure act of the divine "impulse".T hiso rganism was, of course, the individual human being Jesus. Turning again to the church,i ti st rue that no individual human being amongt he redeemedc onstitutes such an adequate vehicleo ft he divine presence. Sin always remains as ar ival force in the individual, ap ower whichd ecisively shaped the individualb efore the advento fr edemption and whichi s, afterwards,acontinuing source of resistance to be overcome.H ence those aspects of any individual human being whicha re broughti nto obedience to the higher consciousness represent only smallf ragments of the redemption of the total reality of humanity. But together,a st he whole church in space and time, the redeemeda mount to "the sum-total of all the forms of spiritual life based on the varieties of natural foundation",m utually and reciprocally 
V.
Enough has been said to show thata ni dentical logic of divine-human union is operative in Schleiermacher'su nderstanding both of the person of Christ and of the communication of theH oly Spirit. It remains to show, in this section,h ow thef oregoing discussions provide the key to understanding the famous( or infamous) "Conclusion" to the Christian Faith which contains Schleiermacher'sd iscussion of the idea of God as Trinity.A sw ith the passagesa lready examined, this is ar ich and fascinating albeitc omplex and tantalizingly brief section;w hat follows is designedo nly to provide a preliminary orientation to these few pages, not to summarize them exhaustively. Two questions are of concern in this "Conclusion".F irst,h ow Schleiermacher understands the nature and function of the doctrine of the Trinity,a nd second, what he believes the Christian Faith has contributed to its more adequate formulation for the present time. Thiss ection is concerned witht he first.
One must obviouslyb egin with ther inging claimo ft he proposition with which §170 opens: "All that is essential in this Second Aspect of the SecondP arto fo ur expositioni sa lso posited in what is essential in the doctrine of the Trinity" (CG II 514 [CF 738]). He is referring to the entire massive treatment of grace whicht akes up over half of his dogmatic treatise; thee ssence of the doctrine of the Trinity and the essence of Schleiermacher'se ntires oteriology, in fact the heart of his dogmatics, are one and the same. (Thus,p roperlys peaking,t he discussion of theT rinity is the "conclusion" not to the Christian Faith as aw hole,b ut to the second aspect of the second part, the doctrine of grace or redemption.) This is not surprising, since as he immediately reminds ther eader the twofold union of the divine being with human nature (through the selfhood of Christ and through the collective spirito ft he church) is "essential" to his entire treatment of Christian redemption. It need only be recalled how the entire structure of his soteriology unfolds, so to speak, from the treatment of Christ'sp erson. For the content of thesectionont he work of Christ is identical with thecontent of the section on his person, only the point of view being different. (This is the argument of §92.) And in turn not only the following division on salvation in the individual but also the whole second section on the origin, subsistencea nd consummation of the church are to be regardeda s" that which came to pass through" the Christ whose person and work are so carefully laid out beforehand ( § 92.3; CG II 41 [CF 376]). Finally, there is the striking claimt hat the full treatment of theo perations of the Holy Spirit cannot be limited to an account of the way it is ad ivine unionw ith human nature; the latter provides only af ormals chema,w hose content is only filled out by the extensive treatmento ft he subsistence of the church, includingt he doctrines of scripture, ministry, the sacraments, etc ( § 123.1; CG II 288 [CF 569]).
So "the whole view of Christianity set forth in our Churchs tandsa nd falls" with the propera ffirmation of the two saving unions of God with humanity ( § 170.1; CG II 515 [CF 738]). But if the latter forms the heart of Schleiermacher'st reatment of grace, what does the doctrine of the Trinity itself add to what has alreadyb een said at such length? What is distinctive aboutt he doctrine of the Trinity is not so much am atter of its contenta so fi ts function andf orm. Its function is defensive; the doctrine originally "established itself in defence of the position that in Christ there was present nothing less than theD ivine being, whicha lso indwells the Christian Churcha si ts common Spirit, and that we take these expressions in no reduced or sheerlya rtificial sense" ( § 170.1; CG II 515 [CF 738]). Thus the doctrine of the Trinity should acta saprophylaxis againsta ny fatal Arian dilutions of the church'sc onfession of God'ss aving conjunctions with humanityi ns alvation history. Just how seriously Schleiermacher takes this function is suggested by his architectural image of the doctrine as the keystone (Schlußstein)o fC hristian doctrine ( § 170.1; CG II 516 [CF 739]). The keystone is the topmost central piece that joins the two sides of an arch and hence completes it. Thism akes sense in light of the doctrine's defensive function: it does not form the substance of the arch but it does anchori ts structurally crucialp oint, enabling it to maintain its shape.
What form must this doctrine take, then, which will allow it to serve its function? It is obviouslyn ot to be simply a repetition of the entire soteriology or even of the doctrineso ft he divine unionsw ith humanityc onstituting Christ andt he church expounded earlier in thed ogmatic treatise. The keystone imagem ay prove helpful again here; the keystone'sf unction of serving as the central joint or pointo fc onnection for the sides of the arch is possible due to its unique shape whicha llows it to receive and connect both its sides, holding them together in symmetrical alignment. In like manner, the function of safeguarding redemption through the divine unions will requiret he doctrine of the Trinity to take on a "combining and connecting [zusammenstellende und verknüpfende]" structure, one which allows it to bring into as ynoptic coordination the assertions dispersed throughout the dogmatics concerning the divine being itself and its modes of "presence" in the worldw hichw eh avep reviously discussed.
12 In Schleiermacher'sw ords,t he doctrine will have to take the form of "defin [ing] this peculiar existence of God in that whichi so ther, in its relation both to the existence of God in Himselfa nd to the existence of God in relation to the world in general" ( § 172.1; CG II 528 [CF 748]).
Thus three sorts of dogmaticu tterance about God'sb eing or existence (first in the world as it creative source, second in Christ, and third in the church)a re to be aligned witho ne another in order to show their intelligibility andc onvergence upon ac ommon divine referent. "Gleichstellen" is the key verb for understanding the doctrine of the Trinity; it must enable the three kindso ft alk about the divine "Wesen" to form an etworko f representations or expressions whicha re mutually equated andi dentified with reference to one another. But this is not in order to add an ew doctrine about God; it is rather the various facets of the doctrine of redemption which are hereby interconnected. In order to summarize, in the concluding sectiono ft his paper, what Schleiermacher thoughth is dogmatics had contributed towardr estating the doctrine of the Trinity forh is own day, the remainder of this section will have to briefly sketch the task he thought confronted the dogmatician in this area.
The task is essentially defined by Schleiermacher'sc ritique( §171; CG II 519 -27 [CF 742 -7]) of ther eceived orthodox formulae of Trinitar-ian doctrine (a critique which is, of course, closelyc onnected with the historical interpretations developedi nh is 1822 essay "On the oppositionb etweent he Sabellian and the Athanasian Representation of the Trinity").
13
In outline and leaving aside many details, the story he tells goes like this. In the polemical heat of various controversies during the early centuries of the church those theorists of the Trinity who later came to be accepted as orthodox felt compelled to trace God'su nionsw ith Christ and the church back to certain eternally separates ubsistences within God'sb eing. And in turn, the concept thereby developedo fa ne ternal "Son" prior to the incarnation seemedt od emand that the one he called his "Father" should also (retroactively, as it were)b ea ccorded the status of a "person" in order to avoid the specter of subordinationism. Theset wo moves, as Schleiermacher sees it, smuggled as eriousi ncoherence into the heart of the classical doctrine of the Trinity.
That incoherence meant that even though thed octrine has indeed performedt he necessary function allotted to it, this has come at ah igh cost. Orthodox Trinitarian thought quite properlys oughtt oe quate the status of the divine being in itself with that of the divine presences in Christ andt he church.F ailure to affirm this would have been fatal to the Christian doctrine of redemption,s ince it would have called into question its central confession: that the living fellowship of Christians with Jesus Christ and their participationi nt he Holy Spirit are in the strictest sense nothing other than their fellowshipw ithG od. But the twofold presupposition (eternally separates ubsistences, one of them being the Father/creator)b locked any consistent and perspicuousi ntellectualr epresentation of the divine triunity. Distortedb yt hat prior decision,t he doctrine'sn ecessary function could only be served through ad ubious insistence, on the one hand,t hat the three persons were equal in status to each other, and, on the other hand, that the three persons were equal in status to the single divine being. Schleiermacher acknowledges that the church was quite right to zealously defend these affirmations, granted the twofold assumption ( § 171.1; CG II 521 [CF 742 -3]). But it simply could not reduce the differente lements demanding acceptance to conceptual coherence, thus rendering unavoidable continuing oscillations whichc alled into question either theu nity of God or the truly divine status of Jesus ( § 171.3; CG II 522 -24 [CF 744 -5]).
Even worse, this orthodox Trinitarian formula, with its unavoidably speculative elements, was not only fixed as am easureo ff aithfulnesst ot he Christian church; its terminology was also introducedi nto the parallel attempts of the early teachers to clarify the divine status of Jesus andt he Spirit. The great theological achievements in this latter sphere were basic 13 Friedrich S CHLEIERMACHER, "Über den Gegensatz zwischen der Sabellianischen und der Athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität," in Kritische Gesamtausgabe,ed. to Christian self-understanding, but not only were the formulations of Christology andp neumatology now "infected" by the speculative elements in the Trinitarian scheme, the very success of these formulations made it unthinkable to recast the Trinitarian dogma lest the more fundamental insightsi nto the divinity of Christ and the Spirit thereby be undermined as well ( § 172.2; CG II 529 [CF 748] ). This reading of the situation provides the backdrop for Schleiermacher'su nderstandingo fh is own contribution.
VI.
The parrotedc omplaint, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, aboutt he supposed denigration of the doctrine of the Trinity involved in Schleiermacher's "relegation of the dogma to an appendix" is ag ood place to begin. For it is striking that just this positioning (Stellung)o ft he discussion of the Trinity at the endo ft he dogmatic treatise is seen by Schleiermacher as part of his most important contribution to its reconstruction and revival ( § 172.3; CG II 530 [CF 749]). For as the discussion of its form and function should already have made clear,t he Trinity, its importance notwithstanding, is not ap rimary doctrine, not a "Glaubenslehre" or direct expression of redeemedc onsciousness ( § 170.3; CG II 517 -18 [CF 740 -1]). It is instead what might be called a "second-order" doctrine, whichp resupposes the first-order doctrines of God'se xistence in Christ and in the church. Ironically, Schleiermacher claims that the doctrine of the Trinity can only be rescued or resuscitated for the present onced ogmatics has provided reformulations of Christology and pneumatology whichr ender them intelligible in contemporary terms, and which avoid entanglement with the standard Trinitarian terminology.O nly after these more fundamental positions are secured can the dogmatician approach again the Trinitarian formulae themselves withoutf ear that subjecting the latter to critique and reconstruction will endanger the former( §172.3; CG II 530 [CF 749]).
At the heart of the doctrine of the Trinity lies the same contentt hat lies at the heart of the doctrines of Christology and pneumatology: the conceptualization of God'sv ery presence in Jesus andi nt he church. But in the latter doctrines this common content is handled "on the side turned towardt he immediatei nterest of faith" ( § 172.2; CG II 529 [CF 748]); in the doctrine of the Trinity,b yc ontrast, with its coordinating and defensive function in view, this content is conceptually developed with an eye to delivering greaterd ialectical precision ("more exact definitions" as Schleiermacher puts it, §172.3; CG II 530 [CF 749]). But he balances this with a warning. Because the church dogmatician can have no fixed and final formulation of God'sb eing "in itself" or of God'sr elation to the world, but can only construct these "ad hoc" by borrowing schemes from contemporary philosophy,b oth the precision and the permanence of any Trinitarian representation thereby formulated will always be strictly limited ( § 172.1; CG II 528 [CF 748]). We cano nly strive for the formulaew hichb est safeguard what is essential, cognizant of the inevitable anthropomorphisms involved, and aware that our attempts cannotc laim to representapermanent andi rrevocable advance in the ecclesial community'sg rasp of the faith.
With these constraints firmly in mind, Schleiermacherb elievest hat his doctrinal reformulations of divine presence in Christ andc hurch have laid the groundwork for ac onsistent rethinking of the Trinity.B ut he admits that the actual reconstruction of the doctrine remains to be done,a nd that he cannotu ndertake that in his own treatise ( § 172.3; CG II 531 -31 [CF 750 -51]). The reason is that though the conceptual space has now been cleared for it by his dogmaticl abors in Christologya nd pneumatology, the next steps must rest witht he New Testament exegete. For only exegesis will tell us if the self-representations of Christ and the apostolic witness concerning him recorded in scripture reallyd emand the positing of eternal separations in God. If they do, then there is nothing for it but to throw the ball back to the dogmatician, who must see if some better formulae can be found which avoid the incoherences already indicated. But if exegesis should turn out to leave the matter open( and the tenoro ft he whole discussion, as well as his 1822 essay, leave little doubt that this is Schleiermacher'so pinion), then dogmatics willb ef ree to adopt am ore "Sabellian" understandingo ft he Trinity,a bandoning those speculative and troublesome "separations".T his will protect what is essential to the Christian understanding of redemption, the divine existence in Christ and the church, without falling into the classical doctrine'sp roblematic "dualism" of as ingle being over againstt hree persons. 14 So much,t hen, for Schleiermacher'so wn thoughts as to what he had accomplished. In light of the brilliancea nd insight of his approach, as erious critical assessment from ac ontemporary perspective would have to be detaileda nd nuanced, and any such attempt would be welcome were it to occur within thec ontexto faclose engagement with Schleiermacher'sa ctual detailed proposalso nt he Trinity within the context of his whole dogmatic scheme. The preceding paper has provided only some preliminary gestures toward this important work, but enough has been said to suggest some very brief and tentative judgments as to thed eficits and promise of Schleiermacher'sw ay of thinking about the Trinity.T he greatest weakness here is surelyt he flat rejection of any notion of triune personhoodi mma- 14 In light of this discussion it is perhaps significant that Schleiermacher chose to use for the title of his concluding section the term Dreiheit (literally, 'threeness')rather than the term Dreieinigkeit (triunity). For the latter more strongly connotes that historic dualism of oneness over against threeness which he seeks evade ( § 170.2; CG II 516 [CF 739]) while the former is more neutral.
nent within the eternal being of the creator.D eveloping ac ounter-position would have to operate on three fronts. First, his astute critique of the incoherencea nd dogmatic inadequacy of the "ecclesiastical" doctrine,i .e. Niceneo rthodoxy, would have to be answered, and the historical reconstruction of the lineages of the "Athanasian" and "Sabellian" notions of the Trinity whichb olster that critique would have to be probed. Second,t hose assumptions about the sources and limits of dogmatic language which he allows to constrain Trinitarian discourse would have to be confronted by an alternative scheme. Third and perhaps most important, the entire soteriological framework within whichh is notion of the Trinity reflects and codifies, especially assumptions regarding the nature of human being ando ft he final human telos or good with respect to the World andt oG od, would have to be interrogated. 15 The questions which must be put to Schleiermacher'sc onception in these areas are serious and far-reaching,b ut they do not cancel out his penetrating insights, two of whichc an be mentioned which might be especially fruitful for shifting the terms of contemporary Trinitarian discussion. The first insight is by no means unique to Schleiermacher. KarlR ahner, beginning with his seminal 1960 essay, was well-known for his insistence that the centrality and relevance of the Trinitarian dogma could only be rediscovered by discerning at its core the very structure of Christian redemption itself, the historical "economy" of God'sp resence in Christ and the church which was the key to its true and original status as a "Heilslehre",asalvation-doctrine. 16 At just this point one can freelya cknowledge that Schleiermacher'sb asic instincts concerning this doctrine went straightt ot he heart of the matter. Dogmatics must continually relocate the complexities of trinitarian conceptualization in their original fertile ground in the religious experienceo fC hristian practitioners: saving reconciliation with God through communionw ith Christ in his Spirit-filled body (i.e. the church community itself). Manyt heologians would no doubt eagerly acknowledge the need to recover the original role of Trinitarian doctrine as the "grammar" of the three-fold economy of Christian redemptive history, but the delicacy, detail and fruitfulness in that operation which Schleiermacher achieved, oncer ecognized, must remainap ersistent model and challenge.
The second source of illumination to be found in Schleiermacher'sd iscussion of the Trinity follows closelyo nt he first, for he never forgot to situate, with ac onceptual rigor whichr ecalls the great scholastics, the "economies" of divine-human union whichi nform his conception of the doctrine within the austere framework of the radicalo therness of God's creativea ct, the unimaginable asymmetry of the relation between God as source and world as sourced. One of the dangers threatening ad irect retrievalo fc lassical Trinitarian discourse andi ts elaboration underc ontemporary conditions of theological thought, such as has been underway since the latter part of the last century, is that the role and meaning of its language can easily become detached from the broader pattern of soteriological, epistemological and metaphysical assumptions within whichi tf unctioned during the patristic and medieval period. The temptation arises, for example, to conceptualize the Trinity in isolation from the theology of creation, or else to force an ersatzt heology of creation directly from some preferred Trinitarian model.
The resulting failure to make the radicalo therness of God'sc reative act ac entral datum within all apprehension of the divine can resulti na n almostg nostic fetishization of specialr evelation andatension between creationa nd redemption. Equally problematic, the concomitant forgetting of the limits of human knowledge and language aboutG od opens the door to ap rofusion of undisciplined andq uasi-mythical literalizations of the trinitarian idea of "personhood." Hence the proliferation of "social" trinities and other similari nstances of speculative phantasmagoria.A mid this overluxuriant growth of trinity-talk, renewed consideration of the cool anda lmost "classical" dialectic structuring Schleiermacher'so wn approach to the trinitarian problem (the integration of God'sr edemptive act firmly within God'sc reative grounding of the finite order, and thei nsistent submission of the Trinitarian imagination to the disciplineso fi ntellection whichf ollow from the radicality of that grounding relation) provides as alutary refreshment. The restraint andb revity of Schleiermacher'sT rinitarian treatise alltoo-easily suggest merelya nother exercise in submitting the dogmatict radition to modernist critical negation; the right shift in perspective might find in it something akin to the humble submission of our language of God's threefoldi dentity to the strictures of apophatic negation, and consequently am odern recallt os omething quite traditional after all.
SUMMARY
The brief coda devoted to the Trinity in Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith does not intend to marginalize the doctrine. It indicates that the doctrine, though at present still to be completed, is the recapitulation of the entire scheme of redemption. The central structuring concept in that scheme is that of the genuine union between the divine existence of the infinite creator and human nature in Christ, ap attern replicated in the coming of the Holy Spirit as the inauguration of as econd, strictly analogousu nion of God and humanity. The subtle way in which Schleiermacherc onceives these unions in linew ith his rigorous understanding of radical causality of divine creation requires careful unpacking. Only such an analysis brings to light the architecture of the doctrine of the Trinity, and its function as ak ind of meta-doctrine, connecting and coordinating different elements in the doctrine of grace.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die kurze Koda in Schleiermachers Der christliche Glaube,d ie die Trinität behandelt, beabsichtigt nicht, die Lehre zu marginalisieren. Sie deutet eher an, dass die Lehre, obwohl gegenwärtig noch nicht vervollkommnet, die Rekapitulation des ganzen Erlösungsschemas ist. Der strukturierendeZ entralbegriff dieses Schemas ist die genuine Einigung des unendlichen Seins des Schöpfers mit der menschlichen Natur in Christus. Die Ankunft des Heiligen Geistes wiederholt dieses Muster, insofern sie die Einführung einer zweiten, wenn aucha nalogen Einigung von Gottheit und Menschheit ist. Eine sorgfältige Analyse ist notwendig, um den raffinierten Zusammenhang zwischen diesem Einigungsbegriff und Schleiermachers striktem Verständnis der radikalen Kausalität der göttlichen Schöpfung zu beschreiben. Nur eine solche Analyse erklärt den Aufbau der Trinitätslehre und ihre Funktion als Metalehre, die die verschiedenen Bestandteile der Gnadenlehre Schleiermachers verknüpft und koordiniert.
